The profit to a standard short-term return reversal strategy can be decomposed analytically into four components related to (1) across-industry return momentum; (2) within-industry variation in expected returns; (3) underreaction to within-industry cash flow shocks; (4) and a residual consisting of overreaction to within-industry discount rate and liquidity shocks. Only the fourth component is significant and positive in data. A simple short-term return reversal trading strategy based on previous within-industry discount rate shocks generates a highly significant risk-adjusted return three times the size of the standard reversal strategy during a 1982-2008 sampling period. The results suggest that short-term return reversal is pervasive, much greater than previously documented, and partially attributable to investor overreaction to firm-specific discount rate news in addition to liquidity shocks.
Introduction
Short-term return reversal in the stock market, a well-established phenomenon for more than 40 years, has been proven to be both robust and of economic significance. 1 Jegadeesh (1990) , for example, documents profits of about 2% per month over 1934-1987 using a reversal strategy that buys and sells stocks on the basis of their prior-month returns and holds them one month. In an efficient market with a slowly varying stochastic discount factor, asset prices should follow a martingale over short time horizons even though they exhibit predictable variations over longer horizons (see, e.g., Sims (1984) ). Identifying the drivers of short-term reversal profits is therefore important for understanding the failings of the efficient market hypothesis of Fama (1970) .
Two possible explanations for short-term reversal profits have received some attention in the literature. Shiller (1984) , Black (1986) , Stiglitz (1989) , and Summers and Summers (1989) , among others, have suggested that short-term reversal profits are evidence that market prices may reflect investor overreaction to information, or fads, or simply cognitive errors. Another potential explanation is based on the price pressure that can occur when the short-term demand curve of a stock is downward sloping or the supply upward sloping, as in Grossman and Miller (1988) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995a) . In the model of Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), for example, non-informational trades lead to a temporary price concession that, when absorbed by liquidity providers, results in a reversal in price that serves as compensation for those who provide liquidity.
In fact, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) suggest directly measuring the degree of illiquidity by the occurrence of an initial price change and subsequent reversal.
We aim to advance the understanding of what is driving short-term reversal profits in the context of these competing (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses. If reversal comes from initial price overreaction to information, to what type of information is the price overreacting? Is it industry-level news or firm-specific news? Is it news about a firm's cash flow or its discount rate?
If, on the other hand, the reversal observed by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) is mainly due to liquidity shocks, has it remained economically relevant during recent years when market liquidity (by most measures) has improved greatly? Is it relevant even for the larger and more liquid stocks that make up the majority of the US equity universe? In answering these questions 1 See Fama (1965) , Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehman (1990 1 we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the short-term return reversal phenomenon.
The framework for our analysis is a novel analytical decomposition of the short-term reversal profits. The reversal profit is first decomposed into an across-industry component and a withinindustry component. The across-industry component measures the profit to an across-industry reversal strategy that buys loser industries and sells winner industries; the within-industry component measures the profit to a within-industry reversal strategy that buys losers and sells winners within each industry.
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) document a strong industry momentum, in that current winner industries outperform current loser industries in the subsequent month, which implies that the across-industry reversal component will be negative on average. This suggests that the withinindustry reversal component must be the source of the profits of the standard reversal strategy.
Or, to put it differently: Investors overreact to firm-specific news but underreact to industryspecific news. Such stronger within-industry return reversal has been noted in Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) and Da and Schaumburg (2007) . It is therefore of interest to further decompose the within-industry return reversal.
This second decomposition is motivated by Campbell and Shiller (1988) , who decompose the stock return in any period into three components: (1) the expected return; (2) cash flow news; and (3) discount rate news. Accordingly, we decompose the within-industry return reversal into three components related to (1) within-industry variation in expected return; (2) under-or overreaction to within-industry cash flow shocks; (3) under-or overreaction to within-industry discount rate shocks.
In the empirical implementation of our decomposition, we measure expected returns using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and measure the cash flow news directly using revisions of equity analyst consensus forecasts following the procedures described in Da and Warachka (2009) . 2 We back out the discount rate news as the residual, or the difference between the return innovation (return minus an expected return measure) and the cash flow news. This means the empirically identified discount rate component will also incorporate any temporary deviations from 2 Similar approaches are used by Easton and Monahan (2005) and Chen and Zhao (2008) . Crucially, the use of analyst earnings forecasts allows us to measure cash flow news at monthly frequency in real time, which is necessary for implementing the short-term reversal strategy. Furthermore, computing monthly revisions mitigates analyst forecast biases that persist over this short horizon.
2 fundamental value due to liquidity shocks. Such liquidity shocks (which fall outside the Campbell and Shiller (1988) framework) will show up in returns but cannot be explained by changes in future cash flow expectation and therefore (by definition) will be included in the component labeled "discount rate news."
Our sample consists of all non-penny stocks that received sufficient analyst coverage to allow for measurement of cash flow news during the period January 1982-March 2008. Thus our sample includes a subset of relatively large and liquid stocks accounting for roughly 75% of the entire US equity market capitalization, and the results will not be driven by positions in extremely small and illiquid stocks.
We confirm that the within-industry reversal strategy indeed outperforms the standard reversal strategy. While the standard reversal strategy often does not generate a significant positive profit (especially since the 1980s), the within-industry reversal strategy, which is unaffected by the strong industry momentum, always generates a significant positive profit (t-value = 5.76), more than 1.5 times the profit of a standard reversal strategy.
Further decomposing the within-industry reversal strategy into its three components reveals several interesting patterns. First, the component related to within-industry variation in expected returns is on average negative, but its extent is negligible compared to the size of the total reversal profit.
Second, the component related to under-or overreaction to within-industry cash flow shocks is significantly negative (t-value = -8.70), indicating that stock prices on average strongly underreact to cash flow news. It represents (in absolute terms) about 87% of the total reversal profit. Finding that prices underreact to cash flow news is of course not surprising, given the well-documented earnings momentum documented in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) .
Finally, the component related to under-or overreaction to within-industry discount rate shocks and liquidity is large and significantly positive (t-value = 9.11), suggesting that prices on average strongly overreact to discount rate news or suffer from price pressure due to liquidity shocks. This overreaction component is the only positive component of standard reversal profit, and it is about 2.5 times the amount of the total reversal profit. It is clearly the fundamental driver of short-term return reversal.
We demonstrate that our decomposition result is robust to various industry classifications, 3 choice of subsample period, and the exclusion of January months. The decomposition result also holds within each individual industry and across various subsamples constructed according to stock characteristics such as size, book-to-market, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, and liquidity. The overreaction to discount rate news drives the short-term return reversal in every single robustness check we conduct.
While the profit to the standard short-term return reversal strategy often ceases to be significant, its discount rate overreaction component is always significantly positive, with t-values consistently above 3 and often above 8. This is true even among the largest and most liquid stocks in our sample.
Finally, we also implement an alternative decomposition proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) , and confirm that a delayed reaction to common factors is not driving the standard reversal profit in our sample.
We confirm the decomposition results using portfolio-based trading strategies similar to those considered in Jegadeesh (1990) . A standard short-term reversal strategy is a zero-investment strategy that each month sorts stocks into deciles on the basis of prior-month returns, and then buys stocks in the bottom decile (losers) and sells stocks in the top decile (winners). The standard reversal strategy generates a three-factor alpha of 0.44% per month in our sample with a marginally insignificant t-value of 1.93. After we remove the effect of industry momentum and consider a within-industry reversal strategy that sorts stocks into deciles within each industry on the basis of prior-month returns, the three-factor alpha more than doubles and becomes 0.95% per month (t-value = 5.80).
Finally, we consider a modified short-term reversal strategy that sorts stocks into deciles within each industry on the basis of prior-month discount rate news (DR), the alpha further increases to 1.36% per month with a highly significant t-value of 9.81. The alpha is also economically significant, considering that a conservative spread-based estimate of transaction costs is only 0.80% per month.
The success of the DR-based reversal strategy is not driven by the fact that we use IBESmonth (from consensus forecast issuance date this month to consensus forecast issuance date next month). Implementing the strategy in a calendar month generates an even higher three-factor alpha of 1.69% per month (t-value = 10.56). We also confirm that using midquote-computed returns delivers similar results so our findings are not driven unduly by bid-ask bounce.
In addition, the alpha is robust to the definition of discount rate news. In fact, a simple way to identify stocks that experienced large discount rate shocks is to look for stocks whose prices and earnings forecasts are revised in opposite directions during the prior month. Along these lines, we also consider a 3 by 3 within-industry double-sort, first based on prior-month stock returns and then on prior-month earnings forecast revisions. We then buy past losers with upward forecast revisions, sell past winners with downward forecast revisions, and hold the positions for one month.
The profit to this strategy is highly correlated with the benchmark DR-reversal profit and generates a higher three-factor alpha of 1.74% per month (t-value = 12.82).
The fact that short-term return reversal is driven by overreaction to firm-specific discount rate news is also confirmed using cross-sectional regressions. Firm-specific discount rate news is the most significant predictor of next-month stock return with associated t-values above 7 (in absolute terms) in all cases.
Interestingly, our DR-based reversal strategy continues to generate positive profits (albeit insignificant after risk adjustment) during the second month after portfolio formation, but the profit disappears afterward. The short-term nature of the trading profit suggests that profits are unlikely due to a missing risk factor because we do not expect systematic risk exposure to vary drastically at monthly frequency post-portfolio formation.
DR-based return reversals can come from both overreaction to firm-specific discount rate news due to investor sentiment and other cognitive errors and a price reversal following a liquidity shock.
Separating pure liquidity shocks from sentiment-or behavior-driven overreactions to discount rate news is difficult, even in theory, as the concepts of liquidity and sentiment are inherently intertwined. 3 On the one hand, the fact that DR-based return reversal correlates much more with liquidityrelated stock characteristics than measures of stock uncertainty, such as analyst forecast dispersion, seems to suggest that the reversal is driven primarily by firm-specific liquidity shocks. 4 On the other hand, the presence of significant DR-based reversal profit even for the large and liquid stocks and the fact that such profits may persist beyond the first month after portfolio formation are more consistent with an idea that the reversal profit is at least partially the result of short-lived The DR-based reversal profits are not highly correlated with any standard aggregate liquidity factors, suggesting that any liquidity shocks are stock-specific.
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overreactions to firm-specific discount rate news due to investor sentiment and other cognitive errors as also documented in Subrahmayham (2005) .
The key message can be summarized as that short-term return reversal is pervasive, much higher than previously documented, and in part driven by overreaction to firm-specific discount rate news in addition to liquidity shocks. This finding is of general interest to asset pricing researchers, as recent studies by Da and Gao (2008) and Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2010) among others document short-term reversals to have important implications for empirical asset pricing tests. Our decomposition framework is also quite general and can be applied to analyze other return-based anomalies such as medium-term return momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ) and long-run return reversal (De Bondt and Thaler (1985) ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our analytical reversal decomposition framework in details. Section 3 discusses its empirical implementation and describes our sample. Section 4 contains the empirical decomposition results. Section 5 considers various portfolio-based trading strategies and Section 6 concludes.
Decomposing Short-Term Return Reversal
For simplicity, assume that there are N stocks and K industries in the economy. The number of stocks in industry j is N j so N j = N . Following Lehmann (1990) , Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b), we consider a zero-investment portfolio strategy where the portfolio weight on stock i is:
where r M t−1 = 1 N i r i,t−1 is the equal-weighted market return in the previous month. By construction, (1) is a contrarian strategy as it sells more past winners and buys more past losers and is indeed a zero-investment strategy since w i,t = 0.
The reversal strategy return is:
Across-industry momentum and within-industry reversal
We first separate the within-industry component from the across-industry component in the return to the standard reversal strategy:
= − 1
where we define the cross-sectional average return in industry j in period t − 1, r j t−1 , and
Clearly π j t can be interpreted as the profit to a within-industry reversal strategy. The standard reversal profit has two parts. The first term represents the weighted-average of K within-industry reversal strategies (buying losers and selling winners within each industry) weighted by number of stocks in each industry. The second term Ω m,t represents the return to an across-industry reversal strategy (buying loser industries and selling winner industries) weighted by the number of stocks in each industry.
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) document a strong industry momentum in which winner industries outperform loser industries in the subsequent month. As a result, the second term Ω m,t will be negative on average, which in turn suggests that the within-industry reversal strategy will outperform the standard reversal strategy as noted in Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) and Da and Schaumburg (2007) . In other words, the presence of industry momentum reduces the overall profitability of the standard return reversal strategy. 7 Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) find that most of the short-term reversal profit is due to stock price overreaction to firm-specific information. But to which kind of firm-specific news are stock prices overreacting? To address this question, we further decompose the within-industry reversal profit using the framework of Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell (1991) who show that the realized return on stock i in period t + 1 can be decomposed into three components: the expected return (µ), the cash flow news (CF ), and the discount rate news (DR):
Decomposing within-industry reversal
where
∆d denotes dividend growth and ρ is a log-linearization constant which is often set to 0.96 at an annual horizon.
The same decomposition can be applied to the return on industry j:
which allows us to write the within-industry reversal profit as
where CF and DR measure industry-demeaned cash flow or discount rate news, and are thus more 8 likely capturing firm-specific news. π j t can be decomposed into three components as follows:
The first term, Ω j µ , captures the cross-sectional variance of expected returns, µ, in industry j. The second term, Ω j CF , captures the (cross-sectional) average covariance between the current return on a stock in industry j and its previous-month firm-specific cash flow shock. 5 It therefore is a measure of the average under-or overreaction to cash flow shocks in that industry. Analogously, the third term, Ω j DR , is the (cross-sectional) average covariance between the current return on stock i in industry j and the previous-month firm-specific discount rate shock and captures the effect of under-or overreaction to discount rate shocks.
Interestingly, all three components can be interpreted as profits to zero-investment strategies.
can all be viewed as portfolio weights that add up to zero over the N j stocks in each industry.
The return to a standard reversal strategy thus has four components related to (1) acrossindustry return momentum (Ω m,t ); (2) within-industry variation in expected return (Ω µ,t ); (3) under-or overreaction to within-industry cash flow shocks (Ω CF,t ); and (4) under-or overreaction to within-industry discount rate shocks (Ω DR,t ). The equations are:
Our decomposition holds as an identity both period-by-period and on average. We effectively decompose the standard zero-investment reversal strategy into four different zero-investment trading strategies, each with a distinct economic interpretation.
Empirical Measurement
The decomposition (8) requires the measurement of expected returns (µ i,t+1 ), cash flow shocks (CF i,t+1 ), and discount rate shocks (DR i,t+1 ). Once the different components are constructed, the short-term return reversal in equation (8) can be easily implemented.
Expected returns
In order to compute conditional expected stock returns, we need to use a pricing model. To be consistent with the methodology used to risk-adjust returns in our empirical results, we estimate the conditional expected return using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model:
We note, however, that our empirical results do not appear to hinge on the choice of pricing model, (e.g., CAPM or augmented five-factor Fama-French model).
To avoid any look-ahead bias, the factor betas are estimated using monthly returns in the previous five-year rolling window (with a minimum of 36 months of observations) while the factor risk premium is set equal to the average factor return in our sampling period.
Cash flow shocks
A popular way to implement Campbell and Shiller's (1988) return decomposition in equation (6) is necessary for implementing the short-term reversal strategy. Furthermore, computing monthly revisions mitigates analyst forecast biases that persist over this short horizon.
We obtain the analyst consensus earnings forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) Summary unadjusted file. IBES produces these consensus earnings forecasts each month, typically on the third Thursday of the month. To better match returns to earnings forecast revisions, for most parts of our analysis, we examine the IBES-month ranging from the current IBES consensus forecast issuance date (third Thursday this month) to the next consensus forecast issuance date (third Thursday next month), although we do confirm that using the simple calendar month produces very similar results. We initially include all unadjusted consensus earnings forecasts between January 1982 and March 2008. Unadjusted IBES forecasts are not adjusted by share splits after their issuance date. 6 We keep consensus earnings forecasts for the current and subsequent fiscal year (A1 t , A2 t ), along with its long-term growth forecast (LT G t ). The earnings forecasts are denominated in dollars per share, and the t subscript denotes when a forecast is employed. The long-term growth forecast 6 As detailed in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), the earnings per share after a share split is often a small number that IBES rounds to the nearest cent. This rounding procedure can distort certain properties of dollardenominated analyst forecasts such as revisions and forecast errors.
represents an annualized percentage growth rate. This forecast has no fixed maturity date but pertains to the next three to five years.
We first define a simple proxy for the cash flow innovation using only revisions in the earnings forecast for the current fiscal year (A1 t ): 7
Bt for no earnings announcement month 
Given that LT G t exceeds 30% for certain stocks, it is unrealistic to assume that such high 7 For notional simplicity, we omit the firm-i subscript.
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If LT Gt is missing, we set LT Gt = LT Gt−1. If A2t is missing, we set A2t = A2t−1. If A2t−1 is also missing, we set A2t = A1t(1 + LT Gt). If Xt,t+3 < 0, we set Xt,t+3 = A1t(1 + LT Gt) earnings growth will continue indefinitely. Therefore, we assume that expected earnings growth converges (linearly) to an economywide steady-state growth rate g t from year 6 to year 10 in the second stage.
Expected earnings in the second stage are estimated as:
for j = 5, . . . , 9. The steady-state growth rate g t is computed as the cross-sectional average of
We also assume the cash flow payout is equal to a fixed portion (ψ) of the ending-period book value. Under this assumption, accounting clean surplus identity implies that the evolution of expected book value is B t,t+j+1 = (B t,t+j + X t,t+j+1 ) (1 − ψ). The ψ parameter is initially set to 5% since this percentage is close to the average payout rate for the firms in our sample.
In the third stage, expected earnings growth converges to g t , which implies expected accounting returns converge to gt 1−ψ beyond year 10. After ten years, the annualized discount factor ρ = 0.95 also means that the remaining cash flows exert little influence on the earnings beta estimates.
The expected log accounting return e t,t+j is estimated at time t as: 9
where the X t,t+j+1 expectations are defined in equations (9) and (10).
Consequently, the three-stage growth model implies:
Vuolteenaho (2002) shows that the cash flow news are the difference between cash flow expectations 9 Consistent with our notational convention, et,t+j denotes the expectation of et+j at time t. The approximation Eˆlog`1 +
" ignores a convexity term that is mitigated by computing the necessary innovations.
13 over consecutive months; that is: 10
Although earnings forecasts pertain to annual intervals, their revisions are computed over monthly horizons, which helps to mitigate analyst forecast biases that persist over this short horizon.
Discount rate shocks
Since we do not have an empirically observable direct measure of discount rate news, we define the discount rate news as the residual:
In practice, stock prices may temporarily deviate from fundamental values due to liquidity shocks.
Such deviations will appear in returns but do not represent changes in future cash flow expectations or changes in expected returns. One implication of (11) is that any liquidity shocks (which are not part of the Campbell and Shiller (1988) model (6)), are lumped in with the discount rate shocks.
In our subsequent empirical investigation, the discount rate component therefore should be broadly interpreted as it includes both discount rate news and liquidity shocks.
Sample description
Our final sample consists of stock / month observations where the expected return, cash flow news, and discount rate news can all be computed. Table 1 provides a summary statistics for the sample.
On average, there are about 2350 stocks in our sample each month, but numbers increase over time.
While the stocks in our sample represent only one-third of the total number of stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, we cover almost 75% of the US stock universe by market capitalization. In fact, our average capitalization is about $2.5 billion, twice that of an average stock in CRSP. Stocks in our sample also receive high analyst coverage, with an
10
If there is an earnings announcement during month t − 1, we make the necessary adjustments because the forecasting horizon is shifted by one year after the announcement. For example, the first term would include the actual announced earnings.
14 average of eight analyst reports per month. To alleviate the impact of any market microstructurerelated noise, we exclude stock / month observations if a stock monthly closing price is below $5.
Overall, our sample therefore consists of relatively large and liquid stocks receiving high analyst coverage, implying that our results are unlikely to be driven by positions in extremely small and illiquid stocks.
For industry classification, we use the two-digit IBES SIGC code, which classifies all stocks into 11 industries: finance, health care, consumer non-durables, consumer services, consumer durables, energy, transportation, technology, basic industries, capital goods, and public utilities. Table 2 reports the results of the short-term return reversal decomposition (8) In other words, the industry momentum effect means that implementing the short-term reversal strategy within an industry is more profitable than implementing it across the board. One interpretation of this result is that investors tend to overreact to firm-specific news but underreact to industry-level news.
Empirical Decomposition Results
When we further decompose the within-industry component, several patterns emerge. First, the component related to within-industry variation in expected return (Ω µ ) is negative but small (−0.0010 × 10 −3 with a t-value of -0.45).
Second, the component related to within-industry cash flow shock (Ω CF ) is negative and large (−0.1710 × 10 −3 with a t-value of -8.70). The negative Ω CF suggests that a positive (negative) within-industry cash flow shock this month tends to be followed by a higher (lower) return next month, or return underreacts to cash flow shocks measured using earnings revisions. This pattern is consistent with the earnings momentum documented by Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) documented by Ball and Brown (1968) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) .
Finally, the component related to within-industry discount rate shock (Ω DR ), as the only positive component, is large and hugely significant (0.4885 × 10 −3 with a t-value of 9.11). The positive Ω DR , which reflects overreaction to within-industry discount rate news, clearly drives the overall profit to the standard reversal strategy. It is almost 2.5 times the size of the standard reversal profit. 
Subsample results
Results for decomposition in various subsamples are reported in Table 3 .
Panel A reports the decomposition results by industry. We implement the short-term reversal strategy within each industry and then decompose its profit into the three components: Ω µ , Ω CF , and Ω DR . In general, the decomposition pattern is very similar across industries. Ω µ is relatively small and insignificant. Ω CF is always negative and significant, again reflecting a robust earnings momentum that is present in every industry. Finally, Ω DR is again the largest and the most significant component in each industry. It represents on average 163% of the total reversal profit in an industry. There are also some interesting variations across industry. For example, Ω DR is more important in the technology industry where it accounts for more than 220% of its total reversal profit.
We also see whether the decomposition result may vary depending on stock characteristics.
Each month, we sort stocks in the sample into three groups on the basis of a stock characteristic:
size, book-to-market ratio, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. We then implement our reversal decomposition in each group. To save space, we report the results for only top and bottom groups in Panel B of Table 3 .
We first note that the sign and relative size of each component (of the total reversal profit) are similar across extreme groups of stocks. Ω µ is relatively small and insignificant. Ω m and Ω CF are always negative and significant. Ω DR is always the largest and the most significant component, representing on average 2.5 times the standard reversal profit.
Across extreme groups of stocks, we find both the standard reversal profit (π) and its overreaction component (Ω DR ) are higher among smaller stocks, value stocks, illiquid stocks, and stocks covered by fewer analysts. In fact, the standard reversal profit is significant only in these groups.
The overreaction component (Ω DR ), on the other hand, is significantly positive in all groups.
Note that Ω DR can come from both overreaction to firm-specific discount rate news (due to investor sentiment and other cognitive errors) and a price reversal following a liquidity shock. The finding that Ω DR is much higher among small and illiquid stocks with low analyst coverage seems consistent with the liquidity shock-based explanation.
Hirshleifer (2001) suggest that behavioral biases such as overconfidence should be stronger when the decision environment is more uncertain and feedback is slow. If return reversal comes from overreaction due to investor sentiment and other cognitive errors, one typically would expect it to be greater for a stock associated with higher uncertainty. We measure the uncertainty using the analyst forecast dispersion as in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), which is defined as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts across different analysts divided by their average.
Interestingly, across extreme groups of stocks with different forecast dispersions, Ω DR is similar.
We cannot completely rule out the possibility that investor sentiment and other cognitive errors are driving the short-term return reversal. Separating pure liquidity shocks from sentiment-driven overreactions is difficult even in theory, as the concepts of liquidity and sentiment are inherently intertwined. That said, the strong tie between Ω DR and liquidity-related stock characteristics and much weaker tie between Ω DR and uncertainty seem to indicate that short-term return reversal, Ω DR in particular, is driven primarily by firm-specific liquidity shocks.
Overreaction or delayed reaction?
So far, we have shown that the standard short-term reversal profit is driven by overreaction to firm-specific discount rate news or liquidity shocks. Using an alternative decomposition framework, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) raise the possibility that delayed reactions to common return factors are driving short-term return reversals. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) refine the Lo and MacKinlay decomposition framework, and find that most of the reversal profit is due to stock price overreaction, and only a very small fraction of the profit can be attributed to a delayed reaction to common factors.
As our stock sample is quite different from that used in Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) in both the sample period and stock characteristics, we repeat this decomposition within each industry to make sure that delayed reactions to common return factors are not driving the standard reversals in our sample. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) decompose the expected standard reversal profit (E [π]) into three components related to (1) cross-sectional variation in expected return (JT 1); (2) stock price overreaction to firm-specific information (JT 2); and (3) delayed stock price reaction to common return factors (JT 3). Note that the decomposition holds only in expectation, and in any sampling period there will be an error term.
To implement this decomposition, we include stocks with at least 60 consecutive monthly returns in our sample. 11 For each individual stock, we run a time-series regression using a model that includes the three Fama-French (1993) factors and their returns in the previous month as explanatory variables. 12 We use the coefficient estimates to measure the stock price reactions to common Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) include only the contemporaneous and lagged market returns in their model. We use the same market model to decompose the reversal profits and get similar results (available upon request).
factors and the residuals for measuring the reactions to firm-specific information. We report these results in Table 4 .
Within each of the 11 industries, JT 2, which measures the stock price overreaction to firmspecific information, clearly dominates JT 1 and JT 3 in explaining the reversal profits. It ranges from 71% to 135% of the reversal profit. JT 1 and JT 3, which measure the cross-sectional variation in expected return and the delayed stock price reaction to common return factors, are lower than 15% (in absolute terms) and 43%, respectively, of the reversal profit across all industries. On average, JT 2 accounts for about 104% of the total within-industry reversal profit, much higher than JT 1 (-8%) and JT 3 (15%).
Through this alternative test, we confirm the dominant role of stock price overreaction to firm-specific information in explaining the short-term reversal profit in our more recent sample of relatively large and liquid stocks.
Portfolio-Based Trading Strategy Results
We have shown how to decompose the standard reversal strategy of Lehmann (1990) , Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) into four distinct zero-investment trading strategies. Our results demonstrate that the reversal profit is driven mainly by the component that captures overreaction to firm-specific discount news and liquidity shocks. We can also confirm the robustness of this key result using the alternative portfolio-based trading strategy considered in Jegadeesh (1990) . It is easier to see the economic scale of the return to this portfolio-based trading strategy since the investment on both the short and the long side is normalized to $1.
For comparison, we first implement the Jegadeesh (1990) short-term reversal strategy, which sorts stocks into deciles on the basis of prior-month returns, and then buys stocks in the bottom decile (losers) and sells stocks in the top decile (winners). This zero-investment strategy is rebalanced every month. Its average raw return and risk-adjusted returns are reported in Panel A of Table 5 .
In our sample, which covers larger stocks and a more recent period, the standard reversal strategy generates a raw return of 0.67% per month (t-value = 2.90), which is much lower than the 2.49% return documented in Jegadeesh (1990) . After risk adjustment the profit is even smaller, and the three-factor alpha drops to 0.44% per month with a marginally insignificant t-value of 1.93.
When we also include the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (MOM) and a fifth short-run reversal factor (DMU), the alpha is essentially zero as expected. Given this evidence, one could argue that short-term return reversal has become less likely recently among all but the smallest stocks, at least economically.
Our analytical decomposition suggests that the standard short-term reversal strategy is adversely affected by the industry momentum effect. As a result, a within-industry reversal strategy should perform better. This is indeed the case as reported in Panel B of Table 5 . When we sort stocks into deciles within each industry on the basis of prior-month returns, and buy losers / sell winners within each industry, this within-industry reversal strategy generates a return of 1.17% per month (t-value = 6.86). Risk adjustments reduce but do not eliminate the profit. For example, the three-factor alpha is 0.95% per month with a t-value of 5.80, and the five-factor alpha is 0.56% with a t-value of 3.47. These results suggest that stock prices overreact to firm-specific information and that the overreaction is significant even among large stocks for the more recent years.
Our decomposition results have also suggested that stock prices react differentially to different types of firm-specific information. That is, investors on average appear to underreact to cash flow news but overreact to discount rate news. Since return reversal is consistent with overreaction (not underreaction), a within-industry reversal strategy based on past discount rate news should perform even better. To test this, we sort stocks into deciles within each industry by prior-month discount rate news (DR). We then buy stocks in the bottom decile (with the most negative DR) and sell stocks in the top decile (with the most positive DR). We label this modified reversal strategy our benchmark DR-based reversal strategy.
The benchmark DR-based reversal strategy indeed performs the best, as reported in Panel C of Table 5 . It generates a return of 1.57% per month (t-value = 10.78). The profit is still large and highly significant even after risk adjustment. For example, the three-factor alpha is 1.36% per month with a t-value of 9.81, and the five-factor alpha is 0.94% with a t-value of 6.25.
A visual comparison between our benchmark DR-based reversal strategy and the standard reversal strategy is provided in Figure 2 
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Our benchmark DR-based reversal strategy clearly dominates; its return series are both higher on average and much less volatile. As a result, our benchmark DR-based reversal strategy has a much higher Sharpe ratio. For raw returns, the monthly Sharpe ratio is 0.61 for the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy and only 0.16 for the standard reversal strategy. For the three-factor adjusted returns, the monthly Sharpe ratio is 0.58 for the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy and only 0.11 for the standard reversal strategy.
Overall, the superior performance of the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy once again confirms the stock price overreaction to firm-specific discount rate shocks (including liquidity shocks).
Subsample and robustness results
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of implementing the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy by industry. Across all 11 industries, the strategy generates significantly positive profit, with tvalues ranging from 3.85 to 7.64. Moreover, three-factor adjusted profit is still highly significant in each industry. Even with a five-factor risk adjustment, which includes a short-run reversal factor, profit is still significant in most of the industries. Interestingly, the energy industry, with the largest average size, has the highest raw return (2.28%), three-factor alpha (2.15%), and five-factor alpha (2.18%) per month among all industries.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the performance of the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy when we increase the holding horizon from one month to five months. We find that the profit is short term in nature and accrues mainly during the first month after portfolio formation. The profit drops from 1.57% (t-value = 10.78) during the first month after portfolio formation to 0.30% (t-value = 2.40) during the second month. Beyond that, the profit drops to essentially zero.
The short-term nature of the trading profit suggests that it is unlikely due to some missing risk factor because we do not expect the systematic risk exposure to vary drastically at monthly frequency post-portfolio formation. Overall, a significant DR-based reversal profit even for the large and liquid stocks and the fact that such a profit may persist beyond the first month after portfolio formation suggest that the reversal profit is at least partially the result of overreactions to firm-specific discount rate news due to investor sentiment and other cognitive errors.
So far we have used the IBES month, which runs from the current IBES consensus forecast issuance date to the next consensus forecast issuance date. This allows us to better match monthly return to monthly cash flow news measured using consensus earnings revisions. A potential problem is that different IBES months may have very different numbers of days. Although we do not think this problem will lead to any systematic bias in our results, we repeat the analysis using calendarmonth returns as a robustness check. In other words, we compute discount rate news using the return in calendar month t and cash flow news in IBES month t (from the third Thursday in calendar month t − 1 to the third Thursday in calendar month t).
As it turns out, when we use calendar-month returns and repeat the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy, the profit actually improves as reported in Panel C of Table 6 . For example, the raw return increases to 1.86% per month (t-value = 11.64). The three-and five-factor alpha increase to 1.69% per month (t-value = 10.56) and 1.49% per month (t-value = 12.85), respectively.
A well-documented problem associated with stocks traded at low prices is that the bid-ask bounce can lead to a non-negligible upward bias in the average return computation, as Blume and Stambaugh (1983) discuss. To ensure that our results are not unduly affected by the bidask bounce, we follow Subrahmanyam (2005) among others and examine calendar-month returns computed using mid-quotes. The results, presented in Panel D of Table 6 , show that the DR-based reversal strategy evaluated using mid-quote-based calendar-month returns delivers an even higher profit. For example, the raw return increases to 2.38% per month (t-value = 10.60) while the threeand five-factor alpha increase to 2.17% per month (t-value = 9.48) and 1.95% per month (t-value = 9.42), respectively.
We make several parametric assumptions in computing the cash flow news. Do our main results depend on these assumptions? To answer this question, we consider a simple non-parametric way of identifying stocks that recently experienced large discount rate shocks: We look for stocks whose prices and earnings forecasts were revised in opposite directions during the previous month. To the extent that an earnings forecast revision (F REV ) proxies for the direction of the true cash flow shock, a large but opposite movement in price must be due to a large discount rate (or liquidity) shock realization.
To implement this idea, we consider a 3 by 3 within-industry double-sort strategy, sorting first on the basis of prior-month stock returns and then on the basis of prior-month earnings forecast revisions. We then buy past losers with upward forecast revisions and sell past winners with downward forecast revisions, and hold the resulting position for one month. Interestingly, this strategy generates similar profits, as reported in Panel E of Table 6 . For example, the double-sort strategy generates a return of 1.88% per month (t-value = 13.45) with three-and five-factor alphas of 1.74% per month (t-value = 12.82) and 1.21% per month (t-value = 7.77), respectively. Moreover, the time series correlation between this non-parametric DR strategy and the parametric DR strategy is very high (ρ = 0.75) as is its correlation with Ω DR (ρ = 0.74), consistent with a conclusion that the alternative strategies capture the same effect of discount rate shocks. Table 7 reports average portfolio characteristics across the decile portfolios sorted on withinindustry discount rate shock (DR). Stocks in portfolio 1 on average experienced a large negative discount rate shock (DR = -17.58%) during the formation month (0). The negative discount rate shock comes from a positive cash flow shock (5.15%) but at the same time a large negative return (-11.19% ). Stocks in portfolio 10, however, on average experienced a large positive discount rate shock (DR = 23.97%) during the formation month (0). The positive discount rate shock comes from a negative cash flow shock (-8.26%) but at the same time a large positive return (16.88%).
Portfolio characteristics and cross-sectional regressions
The large return movements (in the opposite directions of cash flow news) are unlikely to be driven by liquidity shocks alone. Although the two extreme portfolios (portfolios 1 and 10) have slightly higher expected returns (1.24% and 1.16%, respectively), the cross-portfolio variation in the expected returns is small. As we saw in the trading strategy results (Table 5 , Panel C), portfolio 1 outperforms portfolio 10 during the first month after portfolio formation. As seen in Table 7 , both raw returns and the three-factor alphas decline monotonically in within-industry discount rate shock (DR), suggesting that DR indeed is a strong predictor of future stock returns due to overreaction to discount rate news and liquidity shocks.
The two extreme portfolios also hold stocks that are relatively small and illiquid, and receive less coverage by analysts than the average stock in our sample. Their average market caps are about one-half those of other stocks in our sample, and their average trading prices are also lower ($30.08 for portfolio 1 and $37.09 for portfolio 10), although they are clearly not penny stocks. Stocks in the extreme portfolios trade more actively according to the turnover measure but are also more illiquid as measured by the Amihud (2002) measure and are covered by fewer than the average of eight analysts. These characteristics are more consistent with the idea that liquidity shocks are the main driver of the reversal profit, although we cannot completely rule out the explanation based on sentiment-driven overreaction.
A trading strategy of buying portfolio 1 and selling portfolio 10 is associated with very high portfolio turnover. On average, 90.2% of the stocks in portfolio 1 and 90.8% of the stocks in portfolio 10 are turned over every month. Such a high turnover is to be expected, because extreme divergence between returns and cash flow news is rather rare, and neither discount rate shocks nor liquidity shocks are expected to persist. The extreme portfolios are also associated with higher percentage quoted bid-ask spreads of 46 basis point and 43 basis points, respectively.
The portfolio turnover ratios and bid-ask spreads together provide a rough transaction cost estimate of 46 × 90.2% + 43 × 90.8% = 80.5 basis points per month for the trading strategy. This estimate is much lower than the risk-adjusted return of our DR-based trading strategy (three-factor alpha = 1.36% per month, t-value of 9.81), suggesting that our reversal profit is also economically significant and not likely simply a manifestation of market microstructure effects.
If our risk-adjusted profit is higher than a reasonable estimate of transaction cost, why is it not arbitraged away immediately? One reason is related to the limit to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Table 7 suggests that a common proxy for the limit to arbitrage, idiosyncratic volatility is the highest for the two extreme portfolios (see Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)).
Thus uncertainty may prevent a risk-averse arbitrageur from trading and eliminating mispricing immediately.
Finally, Table 8 confirms the importance of short-term overreaction to discount rate news in a cross-sectional regression framework. In a Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression, we regress the monthly individual stock return on prior-month return, its components, and other stock characteristics. We compute the t-values using the Newey-West (1987) formula to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms.
The coefficient on return in the previous month is significantly negative, which indicates shortterm return reversals. The industry-demeaned return has a negative coefficient with a larger tstatistic (in absolute terms) than that of the prior-month return. The within-industry cash flow news is strongly positively related to stock return in the subsequent month, indicating the earnings momentum effect.
The regression results suggest that within-industry discount rate news (DR) is consistently the strongest predictor of next-month stock return. The coefficients are negative, and t-values are all above 7 (in absolute terms) in different models. More important, none of the coefficients on priormonth return, industry-demeaned return, or industry-demeaned cash flow revision are significant once the industry-demeaned DR is included in the regression models.
Conclusion
Identifying the causes of short-term return reversal has important implications for empirical asset pricing tests, and more generally for understanding the limits of market efficiency. While financial economists have long studied the profitability of a contrarian strategy of buying recent losers and selling recent winners, we have not had a complete understanding of what is driving short-term reversal profits. We attempt to shed some new light on the sources of short-term reversal profits by proposing a novel analytical decomposition.
We show that the profit to the standard short-term return reversal strategy can be decomposed into four components related to (1) across-industry return momentum; (2) within-industry variation in expected returns; (3) underreaction to within-industry cash flow shocks; and (4) overreaction to within-industry discount rate shocks (including liquidity shocks). Moreover, each component can be interpreted as the profit to a distinct zero-investment reversal strategy.
Proxying for the cash flow shock using analyst earnings forecast revisions, we find that only the fourth overreaction component is large and positive over a 20-year sample period in our sample of large stocks with analyst coverage. A simple short-term return reversal trading strategy based on the previous-month within-industry discount rate shock generates a three-factor alpha of 1.36% per month (t-value = 9.81), three times the alpha of the standard short-term reversal strategy.
Our results suggest that short-term return reversal is pervasive, much greater than previously documented, and driven mainly by a combination of overreaction to firm-specific discount rate news and liquidity shocks. It is, however, difficult to tease out the intertwined effects of sentiment and liquidity, making precise attribution difficult. π represents the profit to a standard reversal strategy, while JT1 measures the cross-sectional variation in expected return; JT2 measures stock price overreaction to firmspecific information; and JT3 measures delayed stock price reaction to common return factors. The last two rows report the decomposition for the profit to a within-industry reversal strategy. The sample period is from January 1982 through March 2008. In the first column, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for short-term return reversal profit. In the last three columns, the numbers in parentheses are the ratios of each of these components relative to the reversal profit reported in column 1. Note that these percentages do not add up to one due to estimation errors. Raw returns and risk-adjusted returns for three portfolio trading strategies: the standard reversal strategy (Panel A), the within-industry reversal strategy (Panel B), and the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy (Panel C). The standard reversal strategy sorts stocks into deciles according to prior-month returns, and then buys stocks in the bottom decile (losers) and sells stocks in the top decile (winners). The portfolio is rebalanced every month. The within-industry (benchmark DR-based) reversal strategy sorts stocks into deciles within each industry according to prior-month returns (discount rate news, DR), and buys losers / sells winners within each industry. The factors to adjust raw returns are the Fama-French (1993) three factors (mkt-f r , smb, and hml), the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (mom), and the short-run reversal factor (dmu) which is constructed from the daily short-term reversal factor available at French's website. The sample period is from January 1982 through March 2008. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel A reports raw, three-factor, and five-factor adjusted returns of the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy within each industry. Panel B reports the portfolio returns during each of the five months post-portfolio formation. Panel C reports raw and risk-adjusted returns for the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy when portfolio returns and discount news are based on calendar months. Panel D calculates daily returns using midpoints of closing bid and ask prices and monthly returns by cumulating the daily midpoint returns within a month. We report raw and risk-adjusted returns for the benchmark DR-based reversal strategy based on these monthly returns. Panel E reports raw and risk-adjusted returns for a 3 by 3 within-industry double-sort strategy, first sorted into three groups according to prior-month stock returns (top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30%) and then according to prior-month earnings forecast revisions (top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30%). We then buy past losers with upward forecast revisions and sell past winners with downward forecast revisions, and hold the positions for one month. The factors to adjust raw returns are the same as in Table 5 . The sample period is from January 1982 through March 2008. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Table 7 Characteristics of discount rate news (DR)-sorted decile portfolios Portfolio 1 has a large negative discount rate shock during the formation month (0), while Portfolio 10 has a large positive discount rate shock. Ret(0) is the simple average monthly portfolio returns in the portfolio formation month, measured in percentage terms. ER is the conditional expected return based on rolling betas estimated from monthly returns in the previous five-year rolling window. CF rev measures the within-industry cash flow shock, where the cash flow news is measured by the analyst consensus earnings forecasts as in Da and Warachka (2009) . Ret(+1) and 3-factor alpha are the simple average monthly portfolio raw and Fama-French (1993) three-factor adjusted returns in the portfolio holding month, respectively. Price, size, BM, and NoA are the simple average of price, market capitalization (in millions of dollars), book-tomarket ratio, and analyst coverage count, respectively. To avoid the bias caused by outliers, we winsorize the BM values at the 99th percentile each month. IVOL is the simple average of the monthly idiosyncratic volatility measured over the portfolio formation month, where monthly idiosyncratic volatility is constructed from the standard deviation of daily residuals from the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. Turnover is defined as the trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. Amihud illiquidity measures stock illiquidity as in Amihud (2002) . Portfolio turnover measures the proportion of stocks that are not in the same DR-sorted portfolios in two consecutive months. Spread measures the simple average of the quoted bid-ask spread for stocks included in the same decile portfolio. 
